In this paper we argue that the Sasaki adjunction, which formally encodes the logicality that different authors tried to attach to the Sasaki hook as a 'quantum implicative connective', has a fundamental dynamic nature and encodes the so-called 'causal duality' (Coecke, Moore and Stubbe 2001) for the particular case of a quantum measurement with a projector as corresponding self-adjoint operator. In particular: The action of the Sasaki hook (a S → −) for fixed antecedent a assigns to some property "the weakest cause before the measurement of actuality of that property after the measurement", i.e. (a S → b) is the weakest property that guarantees actuality of b after performing the measurement represented by the projector that has the 'subspace a' as eigenstates for eigenvalue 1 , say, the measurement that 'tests' a . From this we conclude that the logicality attributable to quantum systems contains a fundamentally dynamic ingredient: Causal duality actually provides a new dynamic interpretation of orthomodularity. We also reconsider the status of the Sasaki hook within 'dynamic (operational) quantum logic' (DOQL), what leads us to the claim made in the title of this paper. More explicitly, although (as many argued in the past) the Sasaki hook should not be seen as an implicative hook, the formal motivation that persuaded others to do so, i.e. the Sasaki adjunction, does have a physical significance (in terms of causal duality). It is within the context of DOQL that we can then derive that the labeled dynamic hooks (forwardly and backwardly) that encode quantum measurements act on properties as (a 1
S
→ b) is the weakest property that guarantees actuality of b after performing the measurement represented by the projector that has the 'subspace a' as eigenstates for eigenvalue 1 , say, the measurement that 'tests' a . From this we conclude that the logicality attributable to quantum systems contains a fundamentally dynamic ingredient: Causal duality actually provides a new dynamic interpretation of orthomodularity. We also reconsider the status of the Sasaki hook within 'dynamic (operational) quantum logic' (DOQL), what leads us to the claim made in the title of this paper. More explicitly, although (as many argued in the past) the Sasaki hook should not be seen as an implicative hook, the formal motivation that persuaded others to do so, i.e. the Sasaki adjunction, does have a physical significance (in terms of causal duality). It is within the context of DOQL that we can then derive that the labeled dynamic hooks (forwardly and backwardly) that encode quantum measurements act 
−) extend to DI(L) × DI(L) they constitute internal operations . In an even more radical perspective one could say that the transition from either classical or constructive/intuitionistic logic to quantum logic entails besides the introduction of an additional unary connective 'operational resolution' (Coecke 2001a ) the shift from a binary connective implication to a ternary connective where two of the arguments refer to qualities of the system and the third, the new one, to an obtained outcome (in a measurement).
QUANTUM LOGICALITY
We claim that logical considerations on quantum behavior and as such, further development of the research field, have been 'corrupted' by two features. Once these two features are neutralized, the way towards an essentially dynamic quantum logic (i.e. a unified logic of 'changes' both for classical and quantum systems), or otherwise put, a true quantum process semantics, is opened. Moreover, the solution to the second 'corrupt feature' indicates that the logicality encoded in pure quantum theory is of a fundamental dynamic nature. Structures somewhat similar to those emerging in the context of categorical grammar (Lambek 1958) , linear logic (Girard 1987 (Girard , 2000 , action logic (Baltag 1999 ) and computation and concurrency (Abramsky 1993; Milner 1999 ) then naturally emerge via a Kripke style approach for logical semantics applied to the operational foundations of physics. The two features that obstructed true logicality areconcerning the second, most non-quantum logicians have always agreed on its weakness:
It turns out that an operational analysis of quantum logicality starting from well-defined primitive notions rather than from formal pragmatism eliminates these two features. Instead: i. As shown in Coecke (2001a) , the injective hull construction for meet-semilattices (Bruns and Lakser 1970; Horn and Kimura 1971) realizes a disjunctive extension of property lattices, the latter being the physical incarnation of meet-complete and conjunctive quantum logicality (and nothing more!), 3 in terms of a complete Heyting algebra that goes equipped with an additional operation, 'operational resolution', which recaptures the initial property lattice as its range, and this goes without any loss of the (physically derivable) logical content of the initial lattice of properties. In the case of an atomistic property lattice the inclusion of the property lattice in its distributive hull actually encodes the 'state space -property lattice duality' (Coecke 2001b) . 4 This construction will be recalled in the fourth section of this paper.
ii. Propagation of physical properties is left adjoint to backward causal assignment (Coecke, Moore and Stubbe 2001) -we provide a more intuitive presentation of this result in the section 5. Also in section 5 , we show that the Sasaki adjunction exactly encodes this adjunction for the case of propagation and backward causal assignment of a quantum measurement. The minimal implicative condition expresses in this perspective merely that the image under projection of the trivial property 1 is exactly the property on which we project, i.e. ϕ * a (1) = a. More important however, recalling that adjointness of Sasaki hook and Sasaki projection for an ortholattice is equivalent to the ortholattice being orthomodular, causal duality provides actually a new interpretation of orthomodularity.
Moreover, as shown in Coecke (2001b) and Coecke, Moore and Smets (2001b) , when combining the following features that result from the above: i. property lattices admit a canonical disjunctive extension giving rise to an irredundant collection of meaningful propositions on properties with a physically significant ordering, ii. a unary connective 'operational resolution' faithfully recaptures the physical properties within the collection of propositions on these properties as its range, and, iii. causal duality applies both to properties and to propositions on properties, respectively restricting physically admissible evolution, and encoding preservation of propositional disjunction. then, a Kripke-style approach for logical semantics applied to the operational foundations of physics yields a logical structure with for each possible physical 'environment' (e.g., a measurement apparatus, a free or imposed evolution, interaction in the presence of another system, etc.) the following connectives: i. two implications (− e → −) and (− e ← −) that extend the physical content of propagation of (physical) properties and backward causal assignment, and, ii. two corresponding adjoint tensors (− ⊗ e −) and (− e ⊗−) of which one is commutative and one isn't. This, since the Sasaki adjunction encodes causal duality, then establishes our claim made in the title concerning the induced dynamic implications by the Sasaki hook. In the 'static limit', i.e. 'freezed dynamics' with respect to some preferred referential frame for space-like properties, this structure yields an intuitionistic logic equipped with the above mentioned operational resolution as an additional operation, and both the hooks (− e → −) and (− e ← −) collapse into the [static] Heyting implication, and the tensors (− ⊗ e −) and (− e ⊗−) become binary conjunction. 6 We also recall here the following spin-off from all the above (for details we refer to corresponding cited papers): i. A proof of linearity for deterministic evolution and for the Hilbert space tensor product as a description of quantum compoundness (Faure, Moore and Piron 1995; Coecke 2000 We will proceed as follows in this paper: Since we feel very strong about the fact that quantum logicality cannot be treated as a purely mathematical matter without specifying what one is actually talking about and that in every other case it might even be better to abandon the word quantum (at least as a reference to physics) in ones discourse, we provide in the next section an outline of the primitive physical notions from which we derive our formal notions. 7 Next, we recall some mathematical preliminaries required for this paper including Galois adjoints, Heyting algebras and the Sasaki adjunction itself. In section 4 , besides briefly recalling the results in Coecke (2001a), we discuss the Sasaki hook in perspective of these, in particular we argue that any true implicative connective on the lattice of properties of a quantum system has to be external and as such cannot be the Sasaki hook. In the fifth section, besides explaining causal duality and as such the true significance of the Sasaki adjunction, we introduce 'dynamic causal relations' which express the intuitive contents of the Sasaki adjunction in an alternative way. These relations form the core of our approach in the sixth section where the formal content of the Sasaki adjunction will be implemented in the framework of DOQL -see also Coecke (2001b) , Coecke, Moore and Smets (2001b) and Smets (2001) . Our analysis in this paper ends with an overview of the dynamic implications (− ϕa → −) and (− ϕa ← −) which we can deduce from the Sasaki adjunction. Finally, section 7 points to the possible impact of our approach on the field of quantum logic and opens new perspectives to be elaborated on in the future.
WHAT QUANTUM LOGICALITY CAN BE ABOUT
We claim that it makes no sense to discuss quantum logicality without specifying what the elements in the considered lattice physically stand for. Indeed, nonsense arguments, as for example indicated at in Foulis and Randall (1984) and Piziak (1986) , emerge due to conceptual mixup. 8 See also Smets (2001 §6) for a more general survey on misunderstandings and misconceptions on physical logicality. To situate our perspective clearly we will recall here two major (well-defined) perspectives which are, although essentially different respectively being ontological (Jauch and Piron 1969; Piron 1976 ) and empirical (Foulis and Randall 1972; Randall and Foulis 1973) , not at all exclusive (Foulis, Piron and Randall 1983 ), but which give rise to different mathematical structures -see for example Coecke, Moore and Wilce (2000) for an overview and Moore (1999) and Wilce (2000) for recent surveys respectively on the Jauch-Piron and the Foulis-Randall perspective. How can one theoretically approach the behavior of a physical system? As philosophers know very well (to whom physicist however in general don't pay much attention) 9 there are different answers to this question. As such, any approach requires a subtle specification of what the primitive notions are one starts from. In Foulis and Randall (1972) and Randall and Foulis (1973) one considers a notion to which we prefer to refer to as "observed events that reflect something about the system's qualities", where in Jauch and Piron (1969) and Piron (1976) one considers "qualities of the system that cause certain events to occur", depending on the particular environment (e.g., presence of a measurement device). As we know from quantum mechanics, the state of the system in general doesn't determine the outcome of a measurement, and, an event provoked by a measurement actually changes the system's qualities. As such, it comes as no surprise that these perspectives yield different mathematical structures. To a certain extend one could say that both in the Jauch-Piron and Foulis-Randall perspective we are interested in how the system interacts with its environment, although in the first case from the 'system's perspective' where in the second case we rather consider the 'environments perspective', including the physicist that effectuates the experiments, or in other words, an endo-versus an exo-perspectivesee also Coecke (2001b) for a discussion on this matter, slightly deviating from the original Jauch-Piron approach allowing some additional flexibility in view of actual applications. Obviously, since the FoulisRandall perspective is an exo-perspective, the measurements are made explicit within the formalism. Their formalism is indeed essentially about how the system's behavior is reflected through measurements, without specifying the behavior itself. In the Jauch-Piron perspective where we focus on the system's behavior itself this is a somewhat more subtle matter. Since it adopts an endo-perspective, the measurement is not a priori part of the 'universe of discourse'. Therefore it will be incorporated in a conditional way, explicitly as "a system in a particular realization p, i.e. state, possesses a quality a if it is the case that: whenever it (in realization p) is within environment e a then it causes phenomenon α a to happen" and it is by this statement that we identify a particular quality of the system 10 -this explicit consideration of the environment (or context), even in the system's endo-perspective, is what gives the operational flavour to this approach. 8 We rather not refer to the papers containing mathematical/conceptual flaws but give credit to those who tackled them. 9 See for example Rovelli (1999) who backs us up on this: "I am convinced of the reciprocal usefulness of a dialog between physics and philosophy (Rovelli 1997 ). This dialog has played a major role during the other periods in which science faced foundational problems. In my opinion, most physicists underestimate the effect of their own epistemological prejudices on their research [...] On the one hand, a more acute philosophical awareness would greatly help the physicists engaged in fundamental research: Newton, Heisenberg and Einstein couldn't have done what they have done if they weren't nurtured by (good or bad) philosophy."
10 Note here also that "whenever the system is within environment e a then it causes phenomenon α a to happen" corresponds with Piron's "whenever a definite experimental project is effectuated we obtain a positive outcome with certainty" (Piron 1976; Moore 1999) where the definite experimental project includes both a physical procedure, say placing the system within environment e a , and specification of what is a positive answer to this procedure, say phenomenon α a happens. By referring to a causal connection we aim to avoid the confusion raised by use of the notion 'certainty' in Piron's formulation. One could also more naively say that Piron's formulation is an active one (from a physicist's perspective) where our's is a passive one. Again, by the passive formulation we avoid any connotation with some role that is in many interpretations of quantum theory ascribed to the so-called 'observer'. 11 Note that operationalism has here nothing to do with instrumentalism. In Piron's formulation the tendency towards
Before we continue let us first recall some basic order theoretical notions. A complete lattice is a bounded partially ordered set (L, ≤, 0, 1) which is such that every subset A ⊆ L has a greatest lower bound or meet A. It then follows that every subset A ⊆ L also has a smallest upper bound or join A via Birkhoff's theorem:
If the bounded poset (L, ≤, 0, 1) only admits finite greatest lower bounds and finite least upper bounds we call it a lattice. In case it has only finite greatest lower bounds and not necessarily least upper bounds we call it a meet-semilattice. A first main example of a complete lattice is the lattice L H of closed subspaces of a Hilbert space H, ordered by inclusion, or, isomorphically, the lattice of orthogonal projectors on this Hilbert space, ordered via P A ≤ P B ⇔ P B • P A = P A • P B = P A , i.e. if and only if we have A ⊆ B for the corresponding subspaces (Dunford and Schwartz 1957 §VI.3). In the closed subspace perspective meets correspond to intersection and joins to closed linear span. In the projector perspective it is harder to grasp the operations meets and join since they only can be expressed in a simple tangible way in case of commuting projectors (Dunford and Schwartz 1957 §VI.3) . A second example is the powerset P(X) of any set X , i.e. the set of subsets of this set, ordered again by inclusion and meets and joins are respectively intersection and union. Orthomodular lattices generalize these two cases of the Hilbert space projection lattice and the powerset of a set. Recall here that an orthomodular lattice is a lattice that goes equipped with an orthocomplementation
and a ′′ = a, and which is such that a ≤ b implies a ∨ (a ′ ∧ b) = b . Alternative characterizations of orthomodularity can be found in section 3 of this paper. One verifies that every modular ortholattice is also an orthomodular lattice, and for that reason one refers to the additional property an orthomodular lattice has compared to an ortholattice as weak modularity.
12 For ortholattices we have as such the following hierarchy Distributive =⇒ Modular =⇒ Weakly Modular , or, in terms of objects, BoolAlg ⊂ MOL ⊂ OML . We refer to Bruns and Harding (2000) for a recent survey on algebraic aspects of this matter. Finally recall that both examples considered above are examples of so-called atomistic lattices respectively having the one-dimensional subspaces Σ H and the singletons {{x}|x ∈ X} as atoms, explicitly,
thus satisfying the general atomisticity condition ∀a ∈ L : a = {p ∈ Σ|p ≤ a} , where Σ denotes the atoms of L , i.e. p ∈ Σ if and only if ∀a ∈ L : a ≤ p ⇒ a ∈ {0, p} . Now, coming back to the two perspectives on logicality mentioned above, we will "initially" take the endo-perspective, and look at the true 'proper' qualities of the system, to which we will refer briefly as properties. Later in the paper, the exo-perspective will enter natually when defining logical hooks. The resulting structure will as such incorporate both! So in this paper a property is definitely not to be envisioned merely as an observed quality/quantity, since that would be an event of the Foulis-Randall perspective. We as such do assume a form of realism in the sense that properties do exist in absence of a measurement. 13 For example, in the dark, one could attribute the property referred to as 'red' to an object which is such that, "whenever there is a white light source brought in its environment that shines on it, it radiates red light". Note here that we implicitly assume a system to be well-specified. Depending on its possible realization p (say state), the system possesses different properties L p , referred to as the actual properties for that particular realization p. The collection of all properties that the system can possess within the boundaries of its domain of specification, all the corresponding realizations themselves being denoted as Σ (any other realization will be considered as destruction of the system), will be denoted by L. This set L goes naturally equipped with a partial order in terms of "actuality of a ∈ L implies actuality of b ∈ L", i.e. for any (fixed) state we have that: if it is the case that "whenever it (...) is in environment e a then it causes phenomenon α a to happen", then this implies that "whenever it (...) is in environment e b then it causes phenomenon α b to happen". Denoting "a is actual in state p" as p ≺ a this formally becomes
Moreover, this poset is closed under 'conjunctions' A of properties A ⊆ L where actuality of A stands for "any a ∈ A is actual", what actually means that, for each a ∈ A, whenever the system (...) is within environment e a then it causes phenomenon α a to happen. 14 So we consider here a not fully specified environment in order to establish, slightly abusively, a disjunction of environments {e a } a∈A (and corresponding phenomena {α a } a∈A ). 15 The feature that distinguishes quantum systems from classical systems is the fact that we cannot define a disjunction of a collection A in this way. Given A ⊆ L, the statement "some a ∈ A is actual" would require a simultaneity, or again slightly abusively, a conjunction of environments what conflicts with quantum theory where we have incompatibility of measurements corresponding to non-commuting self-adjoint operators. The conjunction defined above provides L with a complete lattice structure, where, as already mentioned, the corresponding joins have not necessarily a disjunctive significance. 16 In particular can there be properties b ∈ L that do not imply that some a ∈ A is actual but that do imply the join A ∈ L to be actual, the so-called superposition principle of quantum theory -see Aerts (1981) and Coecke (2001a) for a rigorous discussion on this matter. Let us stress that at this point, as argued in Coecke, Moore and Smets (2001a), the full physically derivable logical content that emerges from our operational setting consists of a consequence relation
since this allows to transcribe the set {"a is actual"| a ∈ A} as " A is actual" it justifies setting
14 Note here that contrary to a Tarskian perspective where one abstracts over the true sense of meets, we give a particular operational significance to it. Conjunctivity is in a sense "conjunctivity with respect to actuality", i.e. with respect to "causing phenomena α a for a ∈ A to happen whenever (...)". See for example Girard, Lafont and Taylor (1989) for a survey of some similar operational considerations on connectives in computation and proof theory, where one focuses in particular on the 'dynamics' underlying proofs and programs. 15 Or, in Piron's terms "choose any a ∈ A and place the system in e a ", i.e. a choice of environment. Again, in order to avoid any cognitive connotation, we prefer to avoid the word 'choice' (although, we don't see any a priori problem in its use). 16 'Disjunctive' to be seen again in terms of "disjunctive with respect to actuality". 17 For the sake of the argument, we initially introduce here a Tarskian notion of consequence relation, i.e. following Tarski (1936 Tarski ( , 1956 ) . As such it can be seen as a binary relation on sets of formulas which satisfies reflexivity, monotonicity and transitivity. Later on we will extend this notion of consequence relation to allow multiple conclusions -see eq. (23) following the ideas of D. Scott. Note however that in contemporary literature this type of consequence relation is often replaced by a 'weaker one' in the sense that substructural logicians prefer to work with multisets and/or non-monotonic logicians drop the monotonicity condition -for more details on this matter we refer to Avron (1994) . 18 One could say that the notation a, . . . (a ∈ A) for representing actuality of each member in A , i.e. ∀a ∈ A : "a is actual" could be simplified by writing down A , since in general in sequent calculus a list of assumptions on the left of ⊢ always has to be interpreted conjunctively, i.e. as identifiable with the meet. However, further we will consider collections A ⊆ L in terms of ∃a ∈ A : "a is actual" and they will also appear on the left of ⊢ since we will consider them as primitive propositions. The notion a, . . . (a ∈ A) is as such required to avoid confusion.
We can introduce a (semantic) satisfaction relation |= ⊆ Σ × L , exactly being the actuality relation ≺ between states and properties -we prefer to have this double use of notation ≺ and |= to stress whether we are either talking about the physical content or the derived logicality. As such satisfaction and consequence are for single assumptions related by
and thus in general we have that a, . . .
. For transparancy of the argument below we essentially consider single properties as arguments. The (hypothetical!) existence of some implication connective (− → −) : L × L would at least require that it satisfies the so-called 'minimal implicative condition', for single assumptions being a ⊢ b ⇐⇒ ⊢ (a → b) , such that it extends the physically derivable implication relation encoded as the lattice ordering, what transcribes in lattice and state terms respectively as
However, validity of deduction moreover transcribes as (sensu Gentzen's sequent calculus) {a,
, what transcribes in lattice terms as
Note here that the minimal implicative condition is actually a weakened form of the deduction theorem.
Validity of both modus ponens
We will come back to this point in the next section after recalling adjointness.
SASAKI ADJUNCTION
We recall some basic features of Galois adjoints. A more detailed survey of Galois adjoints can be found in Erné et al (1993) and for Galois adjoints in a more physical perspective we refer to . A pair of maps f
Stressing the mathematical importance of adjoints, we respectively quote the co-father of category theory S. Mac Lane and logician R. Goldblatt (Goldblatt 1984 p.438):
"... adjoints occur almost everywhere in many branches of mathematics. ... a systematic use of all these adjunctions illuminates and clarifies these subjects."
"The isolation and explication of the notion of adjointness is perhaps the most profound contribution that category theory has made to the history of general mathematical ideas."
One could even say that where in the beginning days of category theory the claim was made that it are the functors and natural transformations that constitute the core of category theory rather than the categories themselves, that it are actually the adjunctions that provide the true power. Coming back to eq.(10), in the case that f * and f * are inverse, and thus L and M isomorphic, the above inequalities saturate in equalities. As we show below, the notion of Galois adjoint retains some essential uniqueness properties of inverses. Whenever f * ⊣ f * then f * preserves all existing joins and f * all existing meets. This means that for a Galois adjoint pair between complete lattices, one of these maps preserves all meets and the other preserves all joins. Conversely, for L and M complete lattices, any meet preserving map f * : M → L has a unique join preserving left Galois adjoint and any join preserving map f * : L → M a unique meet preserving right Galois adjoint, respectively,
Thus, it follows that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the join preserving maps between complete lattices and the meet preserving maps in the opposite direction, this so-called 'duality' being established by Galois adjunction. One also verifies that eq. (10) is equivalent to
Considering pointwise ordering of maps, i.e. for f, g :
where id L and id M are the respective identities on L and M . Now, coming back to eq. (8) and eq.(9) of the previous section one sees that they define, when both of them are valid, an adjunction (a ∧ −) ⊣ (a → −) for all a ∈ L . This particular property, i.e. the existence of a hook that acts as a right adjoint to the parameterized action of the meet, actually defines a Heyting algebra, a type of lattice to which we turn our attention now.
Let us recall some features of Heyting algebras -for a recent survey see for example Borceux (1994) . A Heyting algebra is a lattice (H, ∧, ∨) equipped with an additional binary operation (− → −) : H ×H → H that satisfies a∧b ≤ c ⇔ a ≤ (b → c) , i.e. after exchanging a and b and applying commutativity of (−∧−) , the action of the meet is indeed left adjoint to the action of the hook, explicitly we have (a ∧ −) ⊣ (a → −) for all a ∈ H . As such, a complete Heyting algebra encodes those lattices in which we encode validity of modus ponens and deduction in a semantical way. Also following from this adjointness, in any Heyting algebra (a ∧ −) preserves existing joins, explicitly, a
, so it turns out that a Heyting algebra is always distributive . In fact, any Boolean algebra, e.g., P(X) for any set, turns out to be a Heyting algebra with (a → b) = c a ∨ b , where c denotes complementation, (a → b) then being logically interpretable as "(not a) or b". A so-called pseudo-complement can be defined on any Heyting algebra as ¬(−) : H → H : a → (a → 0) given a lower bound 0 of H . It then however turns out that contrary to a Boolean algebra we in general don't have that ¬a ∨ a = 1 given an upper bound 1 of H , what justifies the notion of pseudo-complement. In this paper we will only consider complete Heyting algebras, where a Heyting algebra is complete if and only if the underlying lattice is complete. Now, since (a ∧ −) preserves the joins of all subsets of a complete Heyting algebra H, we obtain a stronger form of distributivity namely a ∧ ( B) = b∈B (a ∧ b) . In fact, this complete distributivity now fully determines the complete Heyting algebra structure in the sense that for all a ∈ H the map (a ∧ −) : H → H preserves all joins so it has a unique right adjoint (a → −) : H → H. So complete Heyting algebras are complete lattices where the join of all subsets is completely distributive over binary meets. We will now present an example of a complete Heyting algebra which is in general not a Boolean algebra. Let L be any poset and set ↓ a := {b ∈ L|b ≤ a} for a ∈ L and introduce a downset or order ideal as any set of the form
I is an order ideal if and only if I = ∅ and a ≤ b ∈ I implies a ∈ I . Order ideals of the form ↓ a for a ∈ L are called principal ideals. It then turns out that the collection of non-empty downsets I(L) := {↓ [A]|∅ = A ⊆ L} constitutes a complete Heyting algebra. Indeed, since unions and intersections of downsets are again downsets, I(L) is closed under unions and intersections from which it follows that they respectively constitute the join and meet in I(L) . Distributivity of I(L) is as such inherited from that of P(L) . Using eq. (11) we can now compute the corresponding Heyting algebra hook
As pseudo-complement we obtain
The most simple example of a Heyting algebra which is not Boolean is a three element chain {0 < a < 1} . In particular are the downsets of any chain isomorphic to the chain itself, establishing the claim that downsets in general don't constitute a Boolean algebra. Another example are the open sets of a topological space ordered by inclusion.
Recall that for the lattice of closed subspaces of a Hilbert space the Sasaki projection
exactly encodes the action of the orthogonal projector P A that projects on the subspace A , so in particular we have for the action on rays that
where we identify ray(P A (ψ)) in case that ψ ⊥ A with the zero dimensional subspace. Moreover, for an arbitrary orthomodular lattice L , setting
for all a ∈ L, we have ϕ * 
In particular do we as such retain an adjunction of projection action and hook, mimicking the one that one has for complete Heyting algebras that embodies the validity of modus ponens and the kind of deduction theorem obtained by combining eq. (8) and eq.(9) . However, this in no way implies that all tools available in classical/intuitionistic logic will still be valid within this setting. Let us briefly outline how the minimal implicative condition and the adjointness for the Sasaki hook relate, both in the cases that we abstract over the explicit formulation of the Sasaki hook and the Sasaki projection, i.e. the case of a general abstract adjoint implication (Hardegree 1979 (Hardegree , 1981 ) on a bounded poset, and the case of them being explicitly defined on an ortholattice. We follow Coecke, Moore and Smets (2001c). Let J(L) be the collection of isotone maps on a bounded poset L that admit a right adjoint. An adjoint implication is then defined by a mapφ 
From this perspective one can say that the minimal implicative condition incarnates the fact that the Sasaki hook arises as the right adjoint of Sasaki projections. Moreover, these two alternative definitions are actually equivalent to the ortholattice being orthomodular, and as such provide alternative characterizations of orthomodularity, respectively one that can be written equationally, a rather logical one, and one in terms of an adjunction. ii. For all a ∈ L we have (a
19 This view is obviously motivated by the fact that where for a Heyting algebra the actions {(a∧−)|a ∈ L} can be envisioned as projections on a, for orthomodular lattices the Sasaki projections {ϕ * a |a ∈ L} are the closed orthogonal projections in the Baer * -semigroup of L-hemimorphisms (Foulis 1960) which, as mentioned above, coincide in the case of the subspace lattice of a Hilbert space with the action of the closed projectors of the underlying Hilbert space. We also refer to Coecke and Smets (2000) for complementary details on this matter.
By (i.) ⇔ (ii.) , one has a statement concerning logicality attributed to the Sasaki hook in terms of the minimal implicative condition, or equivalently, the Sasaki adjunction incarnates the utterance 'orthomodular logic'. 20 As is reflected in the title and introduction of this paper, we do not follow this line of thought! For us, it is (i.) ⇔ (iii.) that will provide a new interpretation of orthomodularity in terms of causal duality.
TRUE IMPLICATIVE QUANTUM LOGICALITY
In this section we essentially follow Coecke (2001a) (14) and eq. (15) , and recalling that dichotomic measurements are in quantum theory represented by self-adjoint operators with a binary spectrum, the projectors on the corresponding (mutually orthogonal) eigenspaces are then exactly encoded by ϕ * A and ϕ * A ⊥ , where A and A ⊥ are the corresponding eigenspaces. Writing "we obtain either ϕ * A (ray(ψ)) or ϕ * A ⊥ (ray(ψ)) as outcome state" then corresponds to an abstraction over the corresponding probabilistic weights of the two outcomes in a dichotomic measurement, focusing on the fact that whenever we are not in an eigenstate, there is an uncertainty on the outcome. Consequently, there is also an uncertainty on the corresponding 'change of state' (according to the projection postulate), and as such, an uncertainty on the corresponding 'change of actual properties'. We refer to this logical feature of quantum measurements as the 'emergence of disjunction in quantum measurements'. Writing this in a more formal, although intuitive way using a consequence 'symbol' we obtain:
or, when assuming the existence of an appropriate implicative connective −→ perf. meas. of {a,a ′ } that satisfies the corresponding minimal implicative condition this becomes via the corresponding weakened form of the deduction theorem:
Unfortunately, "ϕ * a (b) actual" or "ϕ * a ′ (b) actual", i.e. "a member of the pair {ϕ * a (b), ϕ * a ′ (b)} is actual", is not encoded in the lattice of properties of a quantum system as an element since for example, taking b = 1, we have ϕ * a (1) ∨ ϕ * a ′ (1) = 1 independent on a although the possible states the system can havegiven that "ϕ * a (b) actual" or "ϕ * a ′ (b) actual" -definitely depend on a . Thus, it would make sense to have logical propositions that express disjunctions of properties since they emerge in quantum processes, in the endo-perspective. The question then arises whether we can extend L with propositions of the type "ϕ * a (b) actual" or "ϕ * a ′ (b) actual", or equivalently, "a member of {ϕ * a (b), ϕ * a ′ (b)} is actual", without loosing the logicality encoded in the initial lattice of properties, i.e. the lattice order, and whether this can be done in a non-redundant, canonical or even mathematically universal way.
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A first candidate for encoding disjunctions would be the powerset P(L). However, if a ≤ b we don't have {a} ⊆ {b} so we do not preserve the initial logicality, or, otherwise stated, if a < b then the propositions {a} and {a, b} ('read' {a, b} as: either a or b is actual) mean the same thing, since actuality of b is implied by that of a . We can clearly overcome this problem by restricting to order ideals I(L) := 20 See also Moore (1993) on this matter. 21 For the introduction of the respective concepts of (dichotomic) ideal measurement and (dichotomic) measurement of the first kind, and, conjointly, a (dichotomic) perfect measurement, we refer to Pauli(1958) and Piron (1976) . 22 Note that the fact that the or that we obtain in a perfect measurement is exclusive does not have to be encoded explicitly since it is already captured by the orthocomplementation since we have ϕ *
and ϕ * b ′ are actual" is excluded -0 indeed encodes the 'absurd'.
However, we encounter a second problem. In case the property lattice would be a complete Heyting algebra in which all joins encode disjunctions, then A and { A} again mean the same thing. As argued in Coecke (2001a) , this redundancy is then exactly eliminated by considering distributive ideals DI(L) (Bruns and Lakser 1970) , that is, order ideals, that are closed under joins of distributive sets (abbreviated as distributive joins), i.e. if A ⊆ I ∈ DI(L) then A ∈ I whenever we have ∀b ∈ L :
is a complete atomistic Boolean algebra (Coecke 2001a ) . We can moreover provide a from a mathematical perspective more regourous reasoning which exhibits the canonical nature of this construction. Consider the following definitions for A ⊆ L : i. A is called disjunctive iff (" A is actual" ⇔ ∃a ∈ A : "a is actual") ;
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ii. Superposition states for A are states for which " A is actual" while "no a ∈ A is actual" ; iii. Superposition properties for A are properties of which the actuality implies that " A is actual" (without being equivalent to A) , and, that can be actual while "no a ∈ A is actual". Extending the satisfaction relation encoding actuality by p |= A ⇐⇒ ∃a ∈ A : p |= a allows us to set
(p |= A and p |= A) ⇐⇒ p ∈ Σ is a superposition state of A ,
where a⊢ b means a ⊢ b but b ⊢ a .
Proposition 2. If "existence of superposition states implies existence of superposition properties" then
Proof: See Coecke (2001a) .
•
The necessity condition "existence of superposition states implies existence of superposition properties" can be illustrated by means of the following example. When considering the four element lattice {0 ≤ a, a ′ ≤ 1} even then distributivity and disjunctivity are not necessarily equivalent, for example in the case that Σ = {p, q, r} and p ≺ a, q ≺ a ′ , r ≺ 1 and r ≺ a, a ′ -the superposition state r for a ∨ a ′ has no corresponding superposition property. Note here that for the particular example of quantum theory the condition is trivially satisfied as it is the case for any atomistic property lattice. 24 Now, any complete lattice L has DI(L) of distributive ideals as its distributive hull (Bruns and Lakser 1970) , providing the construction with a (quasi-)universal property. 25 Moreover, DI(L) itself always proves to be a complete Heyting algebra and the inclusion preserves all meets and existing distributive joins. Thus, DI(L) encodes all possible disjunctions of properties, and moreover, it turns out that all DI(L)-meets are conjunctive and all DI(L)-joins are disjunctive -note again that this is definitely not the case in the powerset P(L) of a property lattice, since {a} ∩ {b} = ∅ whenever a = b independent of what a ∧ b is. This means that we can 'extend' the consequence relation of eq.(5) to ⊢ ⊆ P(DI(L)) × P(DI(L)) respectively in terms of consequence and satisfaction as
where we recall that a ≤ b ⇔ ↓ a ⊆↓ b and as such ↓ ( A) = a∈A ↓ a encodes the properties within this set of propositions on properties -A ⊆ L is here to be seen as just a set of properies without the disjunctive connotation of the distributive ideals in DI(L) . As demonstrated in Coecke (2001a) it follows from all this that the object equivalence between: i. complete lattices, and, ii. complete Heyting algebras equipped with a distributive closure, i.e. it preserves distributive sets, encodes a disjunctive representation for property lattices, where we, DI(L) being a complete Heyting algebra, do have a Heyting hook
where the explicit DI(L)-joins are given by
(meets are obviously intersections), and we will argue below that this hook is implicative sensu "with respect to actuality", i.e. in the sense that in the property lattice was conjunctive and in the sense we defined disjunctivity when motivating the use of distributive ideals. One verifies that we actually obtain
The true quantum features are (at this 'static' level) encoded in an operational resolution
that recaptures statements expressing actuality of properties within the larger collection of propositions on actuality of them, and that only for classical systems becomes trivial, being the identity. The logical essence of this representation is such that, rather than seeing the shift "from classical to quantum" as a weakening of the property lattice structure from a distributive lattice to a non-distributive one, we envision this transition as going from a trivial additional operation on the propositions (which as a consequence in the classical case coincide with the properties) to a non-trivial one. Note that the non-distributive features are as such recaptured as the range of this additional operation R , but they don't affect distributivity of the domain. Quantum logic becomes as such ordinary logic with an additional operation, a bit in the sense of modal logic. From a pragmatic formal attitude, this construction however seems to conflict with statements about the non-distributive nature of quantum theory, what, for some authors is exactly the essence of quantum logicality. In the quantum case, the non-distributivity does not come in within the ordering of propositions, but as the range of the operation R which acts on the propositions. Also the other axioms considered in axiomatic approaches, e.g. orthomodularity, have the same incarnation. We refer to Coecke (2001b) for a more elaborated discussion on the significance/conceptions of non-distributivity in the context of quantum theory. Going back to the explicit construction of the Heyting hook for propositions on properties, it as such also turns out that the canonical implication on a lattice of properties is an external one that takes values in DI(L), namely
26 Note here that {a ∈ L | ∀b ∈ B : a ∧ b ∈ C} indeed defines a member of DI(L) . First, we have that
with X a distributive set, i.e. ∀c ∈ L : c ∧ X = {c ∧ x | x ∈ X} , one easily verifies that distributivity of X implies distributivity of {b ∧ x | x ∈ X} and thus (
obtained by domain and codomain restriction of (− → DI(L) −) . If and only if L is itself a complete Heyting algebra, then we can represent this external operation faithfully as an internal one by setting (b → c) := (b → L c) . In particular can our external implication arrow be defined by
as such in a more explicit manner expressing that it generalizes the implication that lives on a complete Heyting algebra where a ∈ (b → L c) then coincides with a
is the set of properties whose actuality makes the deduction "if b is actual then c is actual" true, i.e. given a ∈ (b → L c) , then ∀p ∈ Σ a : (p |= b ⇒ p |= c) where Σ a := {p ∈ Σ|p |= a} . In other words, (− → L −) transcribes in terms of actuality the minimal requirement of any functional formal implication with respect to extensional quantification over the state set. Note that by constructing (
can (again) be made internal via a domain extension, and, that this extension has physical significance and moreover prerserves all the physically derivable logicality of L . As a statement: "(− → L −) is the [closest you can get to] implication on the lattice of properties". In relation to the minimal implicative condition we obtain
Note that → DI(L) as an operation, is the parameterized right adjoint with respect to the respective meet actions {(A ∩ −)|A ∈ DI(L)} . The above leads to a semantical interpretation of (− → DI(L) −)
where, extending the usual Cartan map µ : L → P(Σ) : a → {p ∈ Σ|p ≺ a} , we define µ(A) := µ[A] , the square brackets referring to pointwise application of µ , i.e. in semantical terms, µ(A) = {p ∈ Σ|p |= A} . Note at this point that there is indeed a duality in representing propositions in terms of DI(L) or in terms of a particular subset F(Σ) of P(Σ) defined as F(Σ) := {µ(A)|A ∈ DI(L)} , which, for atomistic L , turns out to be P(Σ) itself. In more syntactical terms, i.e. without referring to the state space interpretation, adjointness allows us explicitly to restate (− → DI(L) −) as
for the latter, rather than explicitly showing that is indeed a distributive ideal such that we can drop the corresponding closure, we can use eq. (27) and verify straightforwardly that
As such, for properties we obtain, syntactically,
How does the Sasaki hook relate to this implication? Since ϕ *
arises as domain restriction of the right adjoint of the action of the DI(L)-meets, the latter encoding for properties the L-meet in terms of intersection of principal ideals. For the corresponding adjoints of the actions we have a ∧ (a 
expressing reversal of pointwise order by adjunction. Thus, from a semantical perspective,
. So, if the Sasaki adjunction doesn't encode a 'real' implication, what does it do. This will be explained in the next section.
THE SASAKI ADJUNCTION INCARNATES CAUSAL DUALITY
Causal duality has been derived in Coecke, Moore and Stubbe (2001) inspired on derivations in Faure, Moore and Piron (1995) . Rather than giving a full derivation, we sketch a more intuitive way of looking at the obtained results. Assume (so we don't give a full proof here) for a system placed in an environment e , e.g., an environment e a sensu section 2, 28 during a time interval [t 1 , t 2 ] (which can be envisioned as being infinitesimal) that there exist the maps:
assigns to any property a 1 ∈ L 1 the strongest property e * (a 1 ) ∈ L 2 of which actuality is implied at time t 2 due to actuality of a 1 at time t 1 ;
ii. 'Causal assignment of properties' e * : L 2 → L 1 that assigns to any property a 2 ∈ L 2 the weakest property e * (a 2 ) ∈ L 1 whose actuality at time t 1 guarantees actuality of a 2 at time t 2 . Since, given a 2 ∈ L 2 , e * (a 2 ) ∈ L 1 guarantees actuality of a 2 at time t 2 , e * (a 2 ) has to propagate to a property that is stronger (or equal) than a 2 and as such e * (e * (a 2 )) ≤ a 2 . Analogously, given a 1 ∈ L 1 , since it propagates into e * (a 1 ) , actuality of a 1 at t 1 guarantees actuality of e * (a 1 ) at t 2 and as such a 1 ≤ e * (e * (a 1 )) . Thus, from e * (e * (a 2 )) ≤ a 2 and a 1 ≤ e * (e * (a 1 )) we obtain e * ⊣ e * , and this adjunction is what we refer to as causal duality. The generality of the principle lies in the fact that besides applying to temporal processes it also applies to compoundness (Coecke 2000) . 30 We started the first paragraph of the previous section with a discussion on (dichotomic) perfect quantum measurements with the aim to exhibit the emergence of disjunction. In view of section 2 we can denote the corresponding environment that provokes such a measurement, i.e. the presence of the corresponding measuring device, as ϕ {a,a ′ } . In the following paragraphs we then additionally argued that the disjunctive extension has the extra advantage that it allows us to encode an external implicative hook on L × L which then extends to an internal implication on the whole of DI(L) × DI(L) . Thus, the use of the disjunctive extension for representing quantum systems goes beyond representing the emergent disjunction in the sense that it has also a pure logical motivation in terms of envisioning (static) quantum logicality as ordinary logicality with the additional presence of a non-trivial operational resolution R : DI(L) → DI(L) . For the particular case of a perfect quantum measurement, we are going to restrict us now to the specific example where we consider a transition only provided a certain positive outcome is obtained, say a for 28 And for simplicity assumed to be non-destructive. 29 The existence can be proved -see Coecke, Moore and Stubbe (2001) and Faure, Moore and Piron (1995) . 30 We want to stress here that causal duality actuality allows us to prove things and is such is not just a fancy way of writing things down. For a proof of linearity of Schrödinger flows, given that the property lattice of the corresponding system is L H , see Faure, Piron and Moore (1995) . For a proof that the tensor product of Hilbert spaces is appropriate to describe compoundness for systems with as property lattice L H see Coecke (2000) . Conclusively, if the space in which we describe the system is linear, then causal duality forces temporal propagation and compoundness to be described by linear maps. These results essentially use Faure and Frölicher (1993, 1994) . simplicity, what actually means that whenever the system is within environment ϕ {a,a ′ } we condition on the fact that a is obtained -note however, not necessarily in a causal manner, i.e. a does not have to be actual before the measurement. A concrete way to envision this specific situation is in terms of a filter, that whenever the outcome corresponding to a is not obtained the system will be destroyed.
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Let us denote the corresponding environment as ϕ a . Now, since the Sasaki projection ϕ * a : L (1) → L (2) -t 2 = t 1 + ǫ -encodes the behavior of a system under a perfect quantum measurement ϕ {a,a ′ } when the outcome corresponding to a is obtained, it encodes the propagation of properties with respect to ϕ a (justifying the notation ϕ * a in perspective of the previous paragraph) and should as such admit a left adjoint expressing (backward) causal assignment, and this is exactly how (a
arises in this setting. Sasaki adjunction constitutes as such an incarnation of causal duality. This already 'partly' explains the title of this paper -a more compelling perspective will be discussed in the next section. In particular will we show how causal duality extends to a dynamic logical setting. First we need to introduce causal relations as a dynamic counterpart to the static ordering of properties in the property lattice.
Along the lines of the heuristics behind eq. (3) we can introduce the following two relations, whenever an environment e is specified, taking a t 1 -perspective :
Now, what do we mean by taking a t 1 -perspective , and, 2-actuality? From the perspective at time t 1 , i.e. before the interaction of the system and the environment e takes place, there are two modes of envisioning actuality at time t 2 , namely i. "a 2 can be actual", the uncertainty being due to the indeterministic nature of the interaction of the system with the environment, and, ii. "a 2 will be actual", definitely. Note that for deterministic transitions these two coincide. Motivated by the modal logic symbolism, we can refer to these two alternatives respectively as 3-actuality and 2-actuality 32 -whenever we mention 3-actuality and 2-actuality we implicitly refer to a t 1 -perspective. 33 In general we clearly have for a fixed property a 2 at t 2 that 2−actuality =⇒ 3−actuality . Formally, this gives us the following (semantical) definitions for e ; and
where the index 1 in (∀p) 1 refers to the fact that we quantify over states at time t 1 , whereẽ * ({p}) denotes the states the system can have after interaction with the environment e and whereẽ * ({p}) |= a 2 stands for ∀q ∈ẽ * ({p}) : q |= a 2 . More explicitly referring to eq.(3) we see that as such the relations e ; and e can be defined in terms of the actuality relation. The major advantage of taking an a priori t 1 -perspective is that it will allow us to introduce binary connectives that extend this relation 'with the same codomain', this extension is to be envisioned in the sense that the relation ≤ ⊆ L×L has been extended to an implicationsensu eq.(31) and eq.(32) -namely (− → DI(L) −) , provided that we considered the disjunctive extension DI(L) of L and not just L itself. When asking the question whether in some manner the relations e ; and e indeed extend to connectives it will as such be no surprise that we should again rather consider DI(L i ) 31 See also Piron (1976) on measurements as filters and see Smets (2001) for a recent survey. 32 For the use of modal-operators in static operational quantum logic, where the operators point out the so-called 'classical limit properties' we refer to Coecke, Moore and Smets (2001a) and Smets (2001, §10) . This however shouldn't be confused with the association to modalities made in this paper.
than L i itself. By 'with the same codomain' we mean that both will be represented in DI(L i ) -note here indeed that we do not require L 1 ∼ = L 2 and as such also not DI(L 1 ) ∼ = DI(L 2 ) . (Obviously, all this requires to some extend a pluralistic attitude, we indeed admit that: One could for example find a motivation to consider a t 2 -perspective; this then leads us to a bouquet of definable causal relations and corresponding dynamic implications.) Note also that the necessity of having to consider the disjunctive extension already follows from the following observation: given a specified referential frame, one could define an environment freeze (with obvious significance), for which it clearly follows that (− freeze ; −) ≡ (− ≤ −) ≡ (− freeze −) , i.e. freeze provides a static limit for the more general dynamic formalism that involves explicitation of the environment. As it can be seen in eq. (42) and eq. (43) , all these considerations will involve introducing the notions of propagation of propositions and causal assignment for propositions, or equivalently, in terms of the corresponding sets of states that make a proposition true with respect to actuality of one of its members, e.g.,ẽ({p}) . We will do this in the next paragraph. First we take a look on how these relations are realized for the above discussed heuristics for the Sasaki adjunction. Following Coecke, Moore and Stubbe (2001) , we obtain respectively by the definitions of ϕ * a and ϕa ; , and, explicit expression of causal duality, that
from which it also follows that a 1
; a 2 , and in particular, using ϕ * a (1) = a , that 1 ϕa ; a . By the second equivalence in eq. (44) we moreover obtain
The case of the backward relation is less straightforward (and in a sense also less canonical). Indeed, both in the definitions of e * and e * we use a forwardly expressed condition in terms of "actuality at t 1 guarantees actuality at t 2 " , where the definition of e points backwardly . However, we can quite easily prove a similar result as exposed in eq. (44) . We first do this for a general environment e . Proof: (⇐=) : From p |= e * (a 2 ) , by definition of e * (a 2 ) as "guarantees actuality of a 2 at t 2 ", it follows thatẽ * ({p}) |= a 2 , so by a 1 e a 2 we then obtain p |= a 1 and thus a 1 ≥ e * (a 2 ) . (=⇒) : We will first prove that e * (a 2 ) e a 2 , i.e. (∀p) 1 (p |= e * (a 2 ) ⇐ẽ * ({p}) |= a 2 ) . Once this is done, a 1 e a 2 given that a 1 ≥ e * (a 2 ) now follows straightforwardly. Since e * (a 2 ) is the weakest property that guarantees actuality of a 2 at t 2 we clearly have p |= e * (a 2 ) for all states p at t 1 that guarantee actuality of a 2 , i.e.ẽ * ({p}) |= a 2 , so we do have e * (a 2 ) e a 2 , what completes this proof.
Note that as a part of the proof of Proposition 3 we obtained e * (a 2 ) e a 2 , and that by Proposition 3 itself we obtain an alternative way of defining causal assignment e * , namely as: ii'. 'Causal assignment of properties' e * : L 2 → L 1 that assigns to any property a 2 ∈ L 2 the strongest property e * (a 2 ) ∈ L 1 whose actuality is implied by 2-actuality of a 2 at time t 2 . This alternative definition clearly exhibits in a more manifest way the backwardness of causal assignment, and consequently, of the action of the Sasaki hook. One easily verifies that contra eq. (44) there is no obvious expression of e in terms of e * . The naive idea one could have to propose e * (a 1 ) ≥ a 2 breaks down on the fact that this would imply e * ⊣ e * what forces e * and e * to be mutually inverse, something that in general (obviously) doesn't hold. We will now proceed by 'extending' the relations ϕa ; and ϕa to operations.
THE SASAKI HOOK WITHIN DYNAMIC OPERATIONAL QUANTUM LOGIC
First note that for general environments e the relations
by replacing "(2-)actuality of ..." by "truth with respect to (2-)actuality of a member of ..." , explicitly, 
indeed yielding an extension of the relations since
One verifies that on their turn (− 
In order to understand the significance of these tensors, first observe that the causal duality derived in the previous section for maps respectively expressing propagation and causation for properties, can also be derived for maps expressing propagation and causation of the propositions in DI(L) , or equivalently , expressing propagation and causation of sets of states in F(Σ) . This actually corresponds to forgetting about the existence of R and applying the construction towards causal duality as if DI(L) ∼ = F(Σ) is the lattice of properties of a classical system. The existence of a right adjoint of the mapê * : DI(L 1 ) → DI(L 2 ) that assigns to A 1 ∈ DI(L 1 ) the strongest proposition in DI(L 2 ) of which truth (i.e. actuality of a member) is implied by that of A 1 , or equivalently, of the mapẽ * : F(Σ 1 ) → F(Σ 2 ) that assigns to T 1 ∈ F(Σ 1 ) the collection in F(Σ 2 ) of obtainable outcome states given that the initial state is in T 1 , then imply preservation of respectively DI(L) and , i.e. disjunction. Complementary, since existence of a right adjoint for propagation of properties encodes preservation of joins for properties, it follows from Coecke and Stubbe (1999) and Coecke (2001a 
Thus, a shift "from classical to quantum" implies, besides the emergence of the operation R , that classical "preservation of disjunction" becomes a pair consisting of i. preservation of disjunction, and, ii. the continuity-like condition of eq.(51) . Thus, coexistence of laws on propagation at the level of L and DI(L) is not a redundancy. 35 One now verifies that
from which follow preservation properties with respect to meet and join, additionally to the ones that follow from the fact that the tensors encode the left-adjoint actions to the hooks.
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How does all this apply to the context of quantum measurements, and as such, how does the Sasaki adjunction fits in at this point. First note that we havê
i.e. ϕ * a andφ * a act in the same on properties due to the eliminated emergence of disjunction in ϕ a . Do we have the same correspondens for the action of ϕ a, * andφ a, * ?
• Thus,φ a, * acts on properties as the Sasaki hook does, and it makes therefore sense to set
What do we obtain in case for eq. (47) and eq. (48) in particular for properties as arguments? Setting c T := Σ \ T we obtain
Note here in particular that the Sasaki hook does appear in the expression of both (a 1 ϕa → a 2 ) and (a 1 ϕa ← a 2 ) , however with a different antecedent than (a 1 ϕa → a 2 ) and (a 1 ϕa ← a 2 ) . One verifies that using
obtained via adjointness of ϕ * a and ϕ a, * and Proposition 4 , and eq.(29) and eq.(30) we obtain
i.e. respectively a forward and a backward dynamic ϕ a -modification of the static hook (− → L −) . Similar equations can be obtained for arguments in DI(L 1 ) × DI(L 2 ) . For the tensors we obtain
By construction we have the following modified versions of deduction and modus ponens (we express them for properties in analogy to eq.(8) and eq.(9) , the significance of the tensors is obvious):
We give a global overview of where the Sasaki operations fit in within DOQL -we introduced the notations ↓ Note that similar considerations can be made for environments ϕ {a,a ′ } instead of ϕ a although then we truly obtain two levels, one for ϕ 
what formally encodes our interpretation of what the Sasaki hook does.
QUANTUM LOGIC RESEARCH? HOW TO CONVERT?
As mentioned above, Coecke (2001a) , the traditional domain of study of quantum-like lattices should now be envisioned as a study of the range of the operation R , with corresponding heuristics. This obviously sheds a different light on the significance of, for example, orthomodularity. Weak modularity actually doesn't come in at all in the disjunctive extension construction -we recall from Coecke (2001a) that orthocomplementation comes in in the sense that it means that operational resolution has an involutive square-root named the 'operational complementation'. However, since orthomodularity is equivalent with the Sasaki adjunction and this Sasaki adjunction in its turn represents causal duality, we have provided a new dynamic interpretation of the axiom of orthomodularity. But, we can push this further. The essential conclusion that comes out of our analysis is that in traditional quantum logic "too much was encoded in too little": properties where identified with propositions, temporal phenomena like 'change of state in a measurement' where statically encoded, the distinction between the structure of properties and event structures was in many occasions mixed up, etc. What about event structures? Since we claimed that there was no conflict between an endo-and an exo-perspective, where could they fit in in our setting? They clearly should lie at the base of structuring the collection of environments. 39 From a logical perspective, this implies a two-dimensional situation: a structure of environments that interacts with a structure of propositions on a system. Of particular interest would then be the case where we restrict to environments {ϕ a |a ∈ L} , as we essentially did in this paper. This would mean that the environments are structured in the same way as the image of R , order-isomorphic to the properties L , so this realizes a structure in which the lattice of closed subspaces of a Hilbert space appears both as the properties and as labels encoding (physical) environments, where actually we rather think about the latter as being the projectors in standard quantum theory. In that sense the situation of "too much being encoded in too little" gets explicitly unraveled, and motivates that it truly seems to make sense to distinguish between closed subspaces and projectors at an abstract structural level although they are in bijective correspondence, the first having an ontological connotation, the second an empirical. This then leads to the perspective that the transition from either classical or constructive/intuitionistic logic to quantum logic entails besides the introduction of an additional unary connective operational resolution R : DI(L) → DI(L) the shift from a binary connective implication to a ternary connective
where two of the arguments refer to qualities of the system and the third, the new one, to an obtained outcome (in a measurement). A better way of putting things would be
where P(L) are the projectors (on corresponding closed subspaces) what for general orthomodular lattices ends up being the Baer * -semigroup of projectors in the Foulis (1960) sense. In view of Piron's (1964) theorem it then follows that this situation fully covers 'pointless quantum theory' -sensu pointless topology in terms of locales, i.e. complete Heyting algebras -since we drop the two point-related axioms atomisticity and covering law in order to have a (complete) orthomodular lattice. Another extrapolation of the setting presented in this paper consists of rather than defining dynamic operations (labeled by environments) on the static propositions DI(L) , we start of from 'dynamic propositions', i.e. propositions on 'propagation of (actual) properties' rather than on actuality itself and here inspiration can be found in research within the domain of for example computational process semantics (Milner 1999) , action logic (Baltag 1999) etc. Obviously, much is still to be done in that direction.
